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HIRING, FIRING, AND RETIRING: RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN AIRLINE LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW
FRANKLIN

A.

NACHMAN*

D URING THE LAST twenty years, dramatic changes
have occurred in the legal relationships between employers and employees. Some of these changes have been
brought about by statutory enactments, the most significant of which have been the Civil Rights Act of 19641 and
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA).2 Court decisions have also significantly contributed to these changes. In this decade, the most significant
development in labor and employment law has been the
erosion of the traditional employment-at-will doctrine,
whereby the employer and employee were free to terminate any employment relationship that did not provide for
a definite period of employment.3 Tort concepts have invaded an area traditionally governed by the law of contract, with the result that damage awards are becoming
both unpredictable and larger.4 The business of hiring,
firing, and retiring employees is a risky one.
Cases involving the airline industry have played a major
role in the development of civil rights law, as well as labor
and employment jurisprudence. These changes in the law
* Franklin A. Nachman, Partner, Semple & Jackson, Denver, Colorado. B.A.
1971, Wesleyan University; J.D. 1974, University of Chicago. Member, Denver
Bar Association, Colorado Bar Association, American Bar Association.
, See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982).
2 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982).
See infra Section IV.
See infra Section IV D.
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have evolved despite the fact that the airline industry was
regulated for many years by the Civil Aeronautics Board;
its labor relations have been governed largely by the Railway Labor Act (RLA); 5 and even until recently, the industry has been highly unionized. This article will analyze
recent significant developments in labor and employment
cases involving the airline industry. It will first review
cases arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.6
The article will then consider recent cases on the issue of
whether the Railway Labor Act preempts the increasing
number of common law contract and tort actions being
brought by employees against airlines. Finally, the article
will discuss the expanding theories of the law of wrongful
discharge and how these theories have affected the airline
industry.
I.
A.

AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT

Hiring Pilots

Airlines frequently have policies providing they will not
hire persons as pilots who are older than a maximum age.
Two federal appeals courts have considered the question
of whether such policies violate the ADEA, and have unfortunately reached opposite results.
In Murnane v. American Airlines,7 the plaintiff applied for
employment with American as a flight officer, stating in
his application that he was forty-three years of age. The
airline did not accept the application, and plaintiff commenced suit.
The core of American's defense was its employment
structure, in which flight officer, co-pilot, and captain
were three successive employment levels, and it was the
policy of the company to require all flight officers to ad45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163, 181-188 (1982).
See supra notes 1 and 2.
7 482 F. Supp. 135 (D.D.C. 1979), aff'd, 667 F.2d 98 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982).
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vance to the position of captain. No one was hired without that goal in mind. American maintained an "up or
out" policy, which required a flight officer or co-pilot to
receive the maximum amount of training required for
such position, and if not qualified to advance to the next
position, the person's employment would be terminated.
Thus the airline's procedures did not allow for a career as
a flight officer or co-pilot.
The district court found that the plaintiff established a
prima facie case of discrimination, since he was a member
of the class of persons intended to be protected under the
ADEA. 8 However, the district court dismissed the complaint because it determined that American's age forty
guideline was a bona fide occupational qualification
(BFOQ) pursuant to the Act. 9 On appeal, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the district
court's opinion, finding that American's age policy was a
BFOQ which was reasonably necessary to normal airline
business.
Evidence at trial showed that "pilot error" accounted
for 90% of all aviation accidents, but that the incidence of
accidents decreased as the pilot gained experience.l° The
court of appeals upheld the district court's finding that
"the best experience an American Captain can have is acquired by flying American aircraft in American's three
cockpit positions."'" The court further noted that since it
took at least ten to fifteen years to progress from flight
officer to co-pilot to captain, plaintiff would not have become a captain until his late fifties, and would have had to
retire at age sixty in accordance with Federal Aviation Administration requirements.' 2 Thus, the court found that
American's policy of limiting its new hiring to relatively
young pilots ensured maximum experience of its captains
8 Murnane, 482 F. Supp. at 144.
9 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1982).
10 Murnane, 667 F.2d at 100.
it Id. (emphasis in original).
12

Id.
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3
with the airline, and thereby maximized safety.'
The court's analysis of the BFOQissue was enlightening. Plaintiff contended that, at most, the policy could
demonstrate a marginal increase in the safety of passengers on the aircraft, and that a marginal safety increase
was insufficient to support a blanket age rule. The court
disagreed, finding that the maximization of safety was reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the airline,
and, in fact, that safe transportation of its passengers was
the essence of American's business.' 4 American was subject to a statutory mandate that it operate its business with
"the highest possible degree" of safety.' 5 As a result, the
court held that the airline industry must be accorded great
leeway and discretion in determining the manner in which
it may be operated most safely, and that merely "safe" operation was not sufficient.' 6 Interestingly, the opinion
stated that courts do "not possess the expertise with
which, in a cause presenting safety as the critical element,
' 7
to supplant their judgments for those of the employer.'
It therefore affirmed the district court's judgment.
One week later, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Smallwood v.
United Airlines. 8 The challenge in that case was to
United's rule denying employment to pilot applicants
over age thirty-five. The court of appeals reversed the
district court's finding that the policy was a bona fide occupational qualification.
Smallwood was forty-eight years old at the time of his
application, and had flown for ten years for another airline. During that time he had served as a first officer and
captain on DC-8 and DC-10 aircraft, which were included
in United's fleet.
At trial, the airline alleged that safety would be ad'14

Id.
Id. at 101.

- 49 U.S.C. § 1421(b) (1982).
W Murnane, 667 F.2d at 101.
17 Id.

- 661 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 456 U.S. 1007 (1982).
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versely affected if it were forced to hire pilots over age
thirty-five. It stated that hiring older pilots would impede
its "crew concept"-the safe and effective operation of its
three-man crews in a coordinated manner. It also argued
that hiring pilots over age thirty-five, significantly raising
the average age of pilot personnel, would disproportionately increase the chance of medical emergencies during
flight. Its medical evidence showed that it was impossible
to predetermine certain latent health problems that could
affect the operation of aircraft. United also presented evidence of an "untraining" factor to be considered when
evaluating the desireability of employing pilots with significant prior experience.
Plaintiff presented evidence that major air carriers
found applicants with prior Navy or Air Force experience
especially desirable, and that a previous merger between
United and Capital Airlines resulted in a merger of flight
crews without incident. The plaintiff also introduced evidence, which the court accepted, that United's physical
examination program was effective in detecting potentially disabling medical conditions, and that future
problems could be detected with a high degree of
certainty.
The court of appeals found, on the same evidence provided to the district court, that United failed to meet its
burden of showing a BFOQ 9 The court did not refer to
the district court decision in Murnane,20 thus leaving to
speculation any attempt to reconcile these cases. The
Fourth Circuit undertook a more active analysis of the evidence presented by the airline, and appeared to have
been influenced by United's early emphasis on economic
justifications for the age thirty-five rule. 2 ' However, as the
court of appeals in Murnane concluded, economic benefits
generated by a valid bona fide occupational qualification
will not otherwise invalidate the company's policy. United
t9

Smallwood, 661 F.2d at 307-09.

2oMurnane, 482 F. Supp. at 135.
21 Smallwood, 661 F.2d at 307-08.
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did not have an up-or-out policy like American's, and the
court of appeals did not appear to be concerned that the
pilots hired at an older age might not progress to the captain's seat.22
The Supreme Court of the United States denied petitions for certiorari in both cases. Courts have subsequently cited these cases when considering the interplay
between airline statutorily mandated safety duties and
compliance with civil rights laws. 23 The cases present two
contrary views toward deference to airlines' safety decisions. However, no cases involving the issue of maximum
age requirements for hiring pilots have arisen since 1981,
and ultimate disposition of this issue therefore remains
uncertain.
B.

Mandatory Retirement for Flight Engineers

Before January 1, 1987, the ADEA prohibited mandatory retirement before age seventy. Western Airlines
required its flight engineers as well as pilots to retire at
age sixty and argued that the mandatory retirement rule
was an occupational qualification. The Supreme Court of
the United States ruled in the 1985 case of Western Air
Lines v. Criswell 24 that such a policy was not a bona fide
occupational qualification.
The Supreme Court's 8-0 decision noted that the flight
engineer monitored a side-facing instrument panel and
did not operate the flight controls unless the captain and
first officer became incapacitated. It stated that while the
Federal Aviation Administration prohibits any person
over age sixty from serving as a pilot or first officer on a
22 On remand, United eventually prevailed by showing Smallwood made material misrepresentations on his employment application, and would have been denied employment regardless of age. See Smallwood v. United Airlines, 728 F.2d
614, 626-27 (4th Cir. 1984).
2. Compare Johnson v. American Airlines, 745 F.2d 988, 992 (5th Cir. 1984) with
Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 581 F. Supp. 821 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (not citing Murnane or
Smallwood).
24 105 S. Ct. 2743 (1985).
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commercial flight, 25 the FAA refused to establish a similar
mandatory retirement age for flight engineers. The FAA
justified retention of mandatory retirement for pilots on
the theory that "incapacitating medical events" and "adverse psychological, emotional, and physical changes" occur as a consequence of aging, and "[t]he inability to
detect or predict with precision an individual's risk of sudden or subtle incapacitation, in the face of known age-re26
lated risks, counsels against relaxation of the rule."
With respect to flight engineers, the FAA said, "While a
flight engineer has important duties which contribute to
the safe operation of the airplane, he or she may not assume the responsibilities of the pilot in command. ' 27 The
FAA also stated that statistics established that flight engineers rarely have been a contributing cause or factor in
commerical aircraft accidents.28
The case was tried to a jury in the district court, 29 which
found in favor of the plaintiffs. The court of appeals affirmed the decision, 30 and the Supreme Court accepted
review on the issue of whether the court's instruction on
the BFOQ defense was sufficiently deferential to the airline's legitimate concern for the safety of its passengers.
The Supreme Court explored the legislative history of
the enactment of the ADEA and its 1978 amendments. It
emphasized that the BFOQ exception generally has only
limited scope and application and must be construed narrowly.3 1 The EEOC adopted the same narrow construction of the BFOQ exception after it received authority for
enforcing the statute. 2
Where safety issues arise, two inquiries are relevant:
Id. at 2746 (citing 14 C.F.R. § 121.383(c) (1985)).
Id. (quoting 49 Fed. Reg. 14,695 (1984)).
27 Id. (quoting 49 Fed. Reg. 14,694 (1984)).
2' Id. at 2746-47.
',Western Air Lines v. Criswell, 514 F. Supp. 384 (C.D. Cal. 1981).
:",
Western Air Lines v. Criswell, 709 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1983).
-1Western Air Lines v. Criswell, 105 S. Ct. at 2750-51 (citing 33 Fed. Reg.
9,172 (1968) and 29 C.F.R. § 860.102(b) (1984)).
.32
Id. at 2751 (citing 46 Fed. Reg. 47,727 (1981) and 29 C.F.R. § 1625.6
(1984)).
25

26
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(1) whether the job qualifications invoked to justify discrimination are reasonably necessary to the essence of the
business; and (2) whether the qualifications are something
more than "convenient" or "reasonable"; they must be
"reasonably necessary" to the particular business, such
that the employer is compelled to rely on age as a proxy
for the safety related inquiry. 3 The employer may satisfy
this requirement in two ways. It could show that it had
reasonable cause to believe that all or substantially all of
the persons over the age qualifications would be unable to
perform safely and efficiently, or that it was impossible or
highly impractical to deal with the older employees on an
individualized basis. 4 Western unsuccessfully argued
that the proper standard of proof for this defense was
whether there existed a rational basis in fact for it to believe that the use of flight engineers over age sixty would
increase the likelihood of risk to its passengers.
Justice Stevens' opinion for the unanimous Court found
that the airline's evidence was not sufficient to allow deference on the issue of safety. He strongly disagreed with
the airline's contention that a court of law was not the appropriate forum for resolution of this issue. The standard
by which the qualification was to be decided was "reasonable necessity," and not "reasonableness. ' 35 The court
held that the jury was adequately instructed on the duties
of safety, and that the jury was sufficiently informed that
safety was the essence of Western's business. It also emphasized that many airlines did not require flight engineers to retire at age sixty, and that age was not a proxy
for qualification for that job.3 6
Unlike the pilot hiring issue, the Supreme Court decision in Criswell leaves no doubt as to the inability of airlines to force retirement of flight engineers at age sixty.
Representatives of all of the major airlines appeared as

-"

See Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, 531 F.2d 224, 234-35 (5th Cir. 1976).

-1

Criswell, 105 S. Ct. at 2752.
Id. at 2751.

311

Id. at 2754 n.28.
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amicus curiae before the Supreme Court. The Criswell decision resulted in increased liability for Western. In December, 1980, it issued a "statement of corporate policy"
reiterating its refusal to retain flight deck crew members
after age sixty on grounds that had been decided adversely to it by the district court in the Criswell case. The
trial judge who heard the Criswell case found this policy to
be a willful violation of the ADEA in Stone v. Western
Airlines .
C.

Downgrading of Pilots to Flight Engineer

Because pilots must retire at age sixty, while flight engineers may choose not to do so, pilots approaching age
sixty often attempted to downbid to positions of flight engineers. Resolution of this issue was further complicated
by the existence of collective bargaining agreements
prohibiting downbidding. Case law on this issue is in conflict. Even though the Supreme Court of the United
States in Trans World Airlines v. Thurston 38 found that
prohibiting pilots from downbidding to flight engineer violated the ADEA, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit reached a different result a year later in Iervolino v.
Delta Airlines.39
In the TWA case, the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA)
and TWA negotiated a collective bargaining agreement in
1977 which required every employee in the cockpit position to retire at the age of sixty. At the time of agreement,
the provision was lawful under ADEA as a "bona fide seniority system." ' 40 However, on April 6, 1978, Congress
amended the Act to prohibit mandatory retirement of a
protected individual because of age. 4 ' The change of law
caused concern for the airline, which believed that the col39 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1257 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
469 U.S. 111 (1985).
796 F.2d 1408 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 1300 (1987).
4,,See United Airlines v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977).
41 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2) (1982).
:7
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lective bargaining agreement, as applied to flight engineers, violated the amended ADEA.
Thereafter, TWA announced that the amended ADEA
prohibited forced retirement of flight engineers at age
sixty and proposed a new policy under which all employees in the cockpit positions, upon reaching age sixty,
could continue working as flight engineers. The airline
delayed implementing its policy until it had the benefit of
ALPA's input, and the union promptly contended that the
amendment to the ADEA did not require any change in
existing policies. Despite union opposition, TWA
adopted a plan whereby a captain or first officer could obtain flight engineer's status only if he submitted a bid for
the position before age sixty and a flight engineer vacancy
existed. If by virtue of lack of vacancies or insufficient
seniority a pilot or first officer could not downbid to flight
engineer before reaching age sixty, he would be retired.
This new procedure was the only one in which a captain
or first officer could not automatically displace or "bump"
a senior flight engineer.
Plaintiffs, pilots who were unable to downbid before
age sixty and were retired, instituted suit against both
TWA and ALPA. They alleged that the transfer policy violated the ADEA because, while the airline allowed captains and first officers displaced for reasons other than age
to bump less senior flight engineers, those compelled to
vacate their positions on reaching age sixty had to resort
to the bidding procedure. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of TWA and ALPA.42 The Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed 43 and found
TWA liable for double damages because of a willful violation of the Act. 44 The court of appeals found that ALPA
had violated a portion of the Act prohibiting unions from
42 Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Trans World Airlines, 547 F. Supp. 1221, 1232
(S.D.N.Y. 1982).
4
Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Trans World Airlines, 713 F.2d 940, 957 (2d Cir.
1983).
44

Id. at 956 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982)).
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causing or attempting to cause an employer to engage in
unlawful discrimination, 45 but that the statute did not permit recovery of monetary damages against a labor organization.46 The Supreme Court accepted the appeal on the
underlying issues of TWA's defenses, as well as its liability
for actual damages.
Mr. Justice Powell, in a unanimous decision, found no
difficulty in holding that TWA violated the ADEA. Noting
that the ADEA proscribes differential treatment of older
workers with respect to "a privilege of employment, '47
the plaintiffs were denied such a privilege by a policy
which enabled them to bump flight engineers for reasons
other than age.
The court next considered, and quickly dispensed with,
TWA's defenses of bona fide occupational qualification
and bona fide seniority system. The extensive medical evidence present in Western Airlines v. Criswell48 was lacking in
this case. Instead, TWA relied on a legal argument that
since the age sixty rule was a BFOQ for captains and first
officers, and Congress was concerned about the effect the
amendment might have in limiting the employer's ability
to terminate workers subject to a BFOQ 49 an individual
could still be compelled to retire from a position for
which age was a BFOQ. Justice Powell, while agreeing
with TWA's reading of the legislative history, held that the
BFOQ defense had to be considered with respect to the
job to which the employee wished to transfer, and that it
was irrelevant that age had been a BFOQ for his former
50
job.
The Supreme Court also rejected the airline's argument
45 Id.
46

(citing 29 U.S.C. § 623(c)(3) (1982)).

Id. at 957.

47 Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 105 S. Ct. 613, 621 (1985) (quoting 29
U.S.C. § 623(a) (1982)).
48

Criswell, 105 S. Ct. at 2748.

49 See S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 11, 14 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 504,514, 517; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 7 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 528; H.R.

REP. No. 527, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1977).
Thurston, 105 S.Ct. at 623.
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that its policy was lawful because it was part of a "bona
fide seniority system."'5 The Court held that any seniority system including a practice such as TWA's was not
"bona fide" under the statute, stating that while the FAA's
''age sixty rule" may have caused plaintiff's retirement,
TWA's seniority plan certainly "permitted" it within the
meaning of ADEA. Moreover, because captains and first
officers disqualified for reasons other than age were allowed to bump less senior flight engineers, the mandatory
system was age based. As a matter of law, the court held
the defense unavailable.52
The Court spent substantially more time reviewing the
Second Circuit's finding of willfulness against TWA. It
held that, while the court of appeals chose the proper
standard, finding a "willful" violation if "the employer
either knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of
whether its conduct was prohibited by the ADEA,"' 53 the
lower court misapplied the standard. The Court rejected
plaintiffs' argument that the violation is willful if the employer simply knew of the potential applicability of the
Act. The Supreme Court held that the record supported
TWA's contention that its officials acted reasonably and in
good faith in attempting to determine whether its plan violated the ADEA. 54 The Court emphasized the immediate
attention given the question by the airline, and the opposition encountered from the pilots' union, including the
filing of a suit pursuant to Section 6 of the Railway Labor
Act 55 to prevent implementation of the policy. In light of
the efforts made by the airline, and the difficult position
that it faced with the union, the Court's decision was
correct.
.5 Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1982).
52 Thurston, 105 S. Ct. at 623.
. The double damages section of the ADEA incorporated the standard of "willful" action from the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(a) (1982). Therefore, in defining "willful," the Supreme Court looked to judicial interpretations of
the word in the context of FLSA and other civil and criminal statutes. Thurston,
105 S. Ct. at 624.
- Thurston, 105 S. Ct. at 623.
.
45 U.S.C. § 156 (1982).
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In Iervolino v. Delta Airlines,56 the Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a jury verdict finding that
Delta's policy prohibiting captains to downbid two steps
to flight engineer did not violate the ADEA. The court
distinguished TWA v. Thurston because of dissimilarities in
the airlines' policies and the evidence presented in support of them.
Delta's policy prohibited captains from transferring to
flight engineer positions, or "two-step downbids." Delta
asserted that the policy qualified as a reasonable factor
other than age (RFOA),5 7 as well as a BFOQ reasonably
necessary to the safe transportation of passengers. The
airline argued that the policy was based on the safety
problems associated with two-step downbids. Delta's expert testimony indicated that when former captains served
as flight engineers, the roles of the crew members might
become confused or ambiguous, and former captains
serving as flight engineers could intimidate other crew
members during an emergency. The airline also argued
that, since an individual pilot may be entirely unaware of
any difficulty in the transition until after a problem occurred, it would be impossible to predict which former
captains would be safety risks.
Plaintiff introduced evidence that there would be no
"role reversal" and that Delta could evaluate each former
captain on an individual basis. He also presented medical
evidence similar to that presented in the Supreme Court
cases involving flight engineers. The jury returned a general verdict in favor of Delta, and the district court denied
plaintiff's post-trial motions. The court of appeals affirmed, finding that any errors committed by the trial
court were harmless.
-- 796 F.2d 1408 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1300 (1987); see supra
note 39. The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari, despite seemingly contradictory results involving other airlines, suggests that the differing results do not produce significant constitutional issues, and that the distinct results may be
attributable to the factual distinctions in the cases and the resolution of those
distinctions by juries.
.1 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1982).
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Rejecting plaintiff's argument that the Supreme Court
decision in TWA v. Thurston made Delta's policy discriminatory on its face, the court of appeals distinguished Thurston on the basis that TWA allowed downbidding in some
circumstances, but not by pilots who had reached age
sixty.5 8 In contrast, Delta proved that its policy against
two-step downbidding applied to all pilots, and plaintiffs
did not present direct evidence of discrimination.
On the airline's BFOQ defense, the court held that the
jury received proper instructions, and that its decision was
not clearly erroneous. One of the instructions stated that
the reasonableness of Delta's safety precautions should
not be judged by the standard of other bodies or other
airlines. The court upheld the instruction, noting that in
Western Airlines v. Criswell, the Supreme Court concluded
standards of the FAA and other airlines are relevant to an
airline's BFOQ defense, but are not to be accorded conclusive weight.5 9 The court of appeals stated that the district court erred in excluding the identities of other
airlines that permit flight engineers, including former captains, to serve after age sixty. Nevertheless, the exclusion
was not reversible error because the plaintiff introduced
testimony of several flight engineers who had served past
the age of sixty and evidence that the FAA had not extended the age sixty requirement for captains and first officers to flight engineers.
The court found the BFOQ and RFOA defenses amply
supported by the record, including evidence from Delta of
accident reports and testimony of pilots showing improper performance of flight engineering duties that
could adversely affect flight safety, especially during
emergencies. The court also decided to consider nonage
factors related to the job qualification, while noting the
divergence of opinion on this issue in many cases involving the airline industry.60
lervolino, 796 F.2d at 1413-14 n.3.
." Id. at 1420.
IO at 1418 n.ll.
ld.
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The divergence between Trans World Airlines v. Thurston
and Iervolino v. Delta Airlines causes the case of Monroe v.
United Airlines6 1 to assume added significance. Plaintiffs in
that case consisted of two separate classes. The first included flight engineers required to retire at age sixty, and
the second consisted of captains and first officers challenging United's refusal to allow them to transfer to flight
engineering positions when they reached age sixty. A district court jury rejected United's claim that its age requirement was a BFOQ and that its refusal to allow the
transfers was based on reasons other than age, in this
case, the airline's bona fide seniority system. The Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected United's argument that a judgment n.o.v. should have been granted on
its defenses. However, the court found that the district
judge erred by improperly instructing the jury on the
BFOQissue and also by submitting an instruction on pre62
text, or defendant's subjective motivation for its policy.
The court held that an employer's subjective motivation is
irrelevant where the BFOQdefense depends solely on the
objective test of whether justification exists for an age
qualification.
The improper instruction on pretext also required a
new trial on the bona fide seniority system defense. Unlike TWA, United argued that it only permitted pilots to
bump flight engineers when the pilots were reasonably
likely to serve as pilots again. Plaintiffs introduced evidence that United did not strictly enforce the requirement
,1 736 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1198 (1985).
62 Cases involving violations of civil rights must follow a three-part test set forth
by the Supreme Court case of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973). The plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of discrimination by showing membership in a protected class (i.e. race, age, or sex) and rejection by the
employer despite the plaintiff's qualification for the job and the employer's need
for personnel. If plaintiff meets this burden, defendant must show legitimate,
non-discriminatory reasons for its actions. Once defendant does so, plaintiff must
show the defendant's evidence is actually a pretext for discrimination. The third
test is irrelevant where discrimination is admitted, but is justified by defenses as
previously discussed. Monroe, 736 F.2d at 402-04.
- Monroe, 736 F.2d at 403.
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that a pilot be able to regain flying status. The court of
appeals found that plaintiffs' evidence was sufficient to
support a finding that United administered its seniority
system in a discriminatory manner, but remanded the case
for further proceedings. 4 It did not decide whether the
system was not bona fide because only pilots forced to retire at age sixty were prevented from becoming flight
engineers.
The Criswell decision will preclude United from justifying any refusal to permit flight engineers to continue
working past age sixty. However, given the conflicting results on the issue of prohibiting captains from bumping
flight engineers, the actual operation of the seniority system by United will become increasingly important.
A case closer to Iervolino is the 1984 decision of the Fifth
Circuit in Johnson v. American Airlines.65 Plaintiffs in Johnson
were flight crew members who desired to remain as flight
officers. A jury found that American prevailed on its
BFOQ defense, and the court of appeals affirmed. 66
American's evidence showed that its policy against placing former pilots in the flight engineer's position improved crew coordination and, more specifically,
prevented the dangers of "command syndrome." Command syndrome occurs when a senior airman, placed in a
subordinate position, mentally or physically resumes his
former role as captain, especially during emergencies. 67
The defense related also to American's "up-and-out" policy, previously discussed in Murnane. Because of the required progression from flight engineer to captain,
permitting former captains or first officers to fill flight engineer slots would result in "seat blocking," and would
prevent promotion of qualified pilots. 68 The court of appeals held that the necessity for on-the-job training and
(14

w,
67

Id. at 407.
745 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3500 (1985).
Id. at 994.
Id. at 991, 994.

68Id.
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recoupment of investment in pilot training could be considered part of a BFOQ defense.69
In EEOC v. Pan American World Airways,70 the issue
before the district court was the validity of a consent decree. The district court disapproved the consent decree
because the settlement agreement offered claimants inadequate compensation and a majority of claimants formally
objected to the decree. 7 ' Pan American argued that its
policy toward sixty-year-old pilots was a BFOQon the basis of Johnson. The district court disagreed that Johnson
provided a strong defense of Pan Am's policy. It distinguished the case on the basis that the plaintiffs in Johnson
did not move for a directed verdict or a judgment n.o.v.
Therefore, the Fifth Circuit had limited its review to
whether there was any evidence to support the jury verdict. Secondly, Johnson did not decide whether an employer could raise a BFOQ defense when it made
exceptions in its general policy. 72 The court noted that
Pan Am had several exceptions to the policy that senior
pilots could not fly as flight engineers, and emphasized, as
the Supreme Court did in Criswell, that these exceptions
refuted any evidence that safety concerns legitimately justified an age sixty pilot retirement rule.73 The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dismissed Pan Am's appeal
on the basis that the district court's order was not final for
purposes of appellate jurisdiction. 4
While at least the conflicts in the case law appear to be
settled, the January 1, 1987 amendments to the ADEA
create the possibility for more litigation by removing the
age seventy ceiling on mandatory retirement. Airlines
wishing to retain the age seventy limitation will have to go
back to court armed with medical evidence, such as that
presented in Thurston and Criswell.
',
70

Id. at 993.
622 F. Supp. 633 (N.D. Cal. 1985).

7, Id.
72 Id.
7

74

at 648-49.
at 646.

Id.
EEOC v. Pan American World Airways, 796 F.2d 314, 317 (9th Cir. 1986).
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Other Pilot Cases

The merger of Pan Am and National Airlines and the
subsequent integration of seniority lists of pilots and
flight engineers gave rise to an ADEA suit in Cook v. Pan
American World Airways. 75 The problems encountered in
merging the lists included different arrangements for
cross-bidding of positions at the two airlines, integration
of a large number of Pan Am pilots on furlough, and reconciliation of the different fleets of the airlines and the
carriers' relative financial strengths. An arbitrator prepared two integrated lists, one for pilots and one for engineers, which the Civil Aeronautics Board approved, but
which proved unacceptable to members of the plaintiff
class, employees of Pan Am.' 6
The complaint alleged that the merger resulted in an
insertion of many under-forty National pilots ahead of
over-forty Pan Am pilots. The complaint also alleged that
the merger resulted in furloughs of Pan Am pilots over
forty. The district court dismissed the case as a collateral
attack on the CAB's order, but the Second Circuit reversed.77 The appellate court held that it had a right to
review the merger for ADEA violations, and stated that
for the plaintiffs to show a violation, they must prove the
seniority system was subterfuge for age discrimination.
The mere fact that plaintiffs were worse off than previously would not be sufficient. The case was remanded to
the district court for reconsideration.
Recent cases involving corporate pilots illustrate issues
that often arise in individual ADEA claims. In Stuart v.
Tenneco, Inc. ,78 the employer discharged one of its pilots
for violation of sick leave and for conflicts of interest.
Plaintiff admitted that he flew while on sick leave status,
but claimed that his dismissal was a pretext for age discrimination. This case is noteworthy because the court
75

771 F.2d 635, 636 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 895 (1986).

76

Id. at 638-39.
See id. at 643.

77

Is 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 536 (S.D. Tex 1986).
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found that the plaintiff did not produce sufficient evidence
on the pretext issue to overcome defendant's summary
judgment motion, and the case was dismissed as a matter
of law.
In the recent case of Wilkins v. Eaton Corp. , the plaintiff
was a 51-year old pilot terminated for refusal to use a
company required checklist. Plaintiff claimed that the
company did not uniformly enforce the checklist requirement, and a district court jury agreed with him. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed and entered judgment as a
matter of law in favor of Eaton. The court of appeals
found that plaintiff's proof failed to show pretext on the
part of the employer and the evidence did not suggest age
discrimination. 8
E. Reductions in Force -

Other Employees

In Barber v. American Airlines,8 three plaintiffs aged fiftyone, fifty-eight, and forty-nine, were required by American to transfer from Little Rock to Dallas. The first two
employees took early retirement, and the third, who was
not old enough to do so, left the airline. Plaintiffs alleged
age discrimination by the airline's refusal to permit them
to bump less senior employees. American disagreed, stating its policy permitted bumping only to positions in
which the more senior employee was qualified. Plaintiffs
countered by arguing that they had a right to be trained
for other positions.
The jury found for the plaintiffs, but the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed and entered judgment n.o.v. in
favor of American. The court found no evidence of favoritism for younger employees, noting that the persons
whom plaintiffs wished to bump were also in the class protected by the ADEA. Furthermore, although some employees were allowed to bump less senior employees,
797 F. 2d 242 (6th Cir. 1986).
moId. at 344.
79

81

791 F.2d 658 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 278 (1986).

50

JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE

[53

there was no showing that age was a determining factor in
the company's decision to permit bumping.
Another case illustrating that jury verdicts for plaintiffs
in ADEA cases get overturned more often than ordinary
82
jury verdicts is Coburn v. Pan American World Airways.
Plaintiff in that case was a reservation supervisor reduced
out at age forty-three. The airline's policy required it to
reduce the least productive employee in the peer group at
issue. The jury found for the plaintiff; the district court
granted judgment n.o.v.; and the court of appeals affirmed the judgment in favor of Pan Am.
The court of appeals found that the airline followed its
policy to the letter. Pan Am demonstrated legitimate
nondiscriminatory reasons for reducing out the plaintiff,
who did not meet the necessary burden to show pretext.
The evidence did not show a pattern of discrimination,
and did show that the productivity rating was properly
applied.
F. Application to Foreign Airlines
In Gadzer v. Air India,83 the district court held that the
ADEA applies to an airline owned by a foreign government as well as to domestic airlines. The court rejected
Air India's argument that as an instrumentality of a for'8 4
eign nation, it should not be considered "an employer
for the definitional purposes of the Act. In 1984, Congress passed an amendment to the ADEA, extending the
Act's protection to United States citizens employed
abroad by American corporations or their subsidiaries,
except when application of the ADEA would violate the
law of the foreign country.85
82

711 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
574 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1982).

See 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(0(i), (h)(i) (1985 & Supp. 1987). Congress did not indicate that the amendment would apply retroactively. Prior to the amendment,
Americans working abroad for American companies were not generally protected
by the ADEA. See, e.g., Pfeiffer v. William Wrigley Jr. Co., 755 F.2d 554 (7th Cir.
1985); Cleary v. United States Lines, 728 F.2d 607 (3d Cir. 1984).
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Flight Attendant Cases

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibiting
race and sex discrimination in employment first impacted
the airline industry when applied to flight attendants. Litigation of sex discrimination claims resulted in class action suits taking several years to resolve. Liability
questions were complex, with the issues further complicated by the difficulty the courts encountered in fashioning appropriate remedies for the victims of sex
discrimination. As will be discussed, the resolution of
these cases often resulted in employees being pitted
against their unions, and unions aligning themselves with
airline management.
1. DiscriminationAgainst Males
The 1971 decision in Diaz v. Pan American World Airways 86 is a landmark case not only for its specific result,
but also for the analysis that would be frequently applied
in other civil rights cases involving the airline industry. In
Diaz, plaintiff, a male, applied for a job as a cabin attendant. He was rejected because Pan Am had a policy of restricting that position to females. The airline admitted its
policy, and the parties stipulated that the primary issue
was whether the female gender was a BFOQ reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of Pan Am's business.
In a decision that reflects a time long since past, the district court found for the airline based on the airline's history of the use of female flight attendants, passenger
preference, basic psychological reasons for the preference, and the actualities of the hiring process. 87 The
court found that the performance of female attendants
was superior in such nonmechanical aspects of the job as
providing reassurance to anxious passengers, giving courteous personalized service, and, in general, making flights
- 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 940 (1972).
Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, 311 F. Supp. 559 (S.D. Fla. 1970).

87
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as pleasurable as possible within the limitations imposed
by aircraft operations. 88 The airline even introduced the
testimony of a psychiatrist, who testified that the airplane
cabin represented a unique environment, requiring the air
carrier to take account of the special psychological needs
of its passengers, which needs were better attended to by
females .8
The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court, emphasizing that the primary function of an airline is to transport
passengers safely from one point to another. The court
found the issues raised by the airline regarding the relative abilities of the average male or female cabin attendant
to be tangential to the essence of Pan Am's business. Use
of strictly female flight attendants was not a business necessity, but at most a business convenience.90
The court also held that the airline's passengers' preference for female flight attendants was insufficient. It referred to EEOC guidelines that a BFOQ ought not to be
based on "the refusal to hire an individual because of the
preferences of co-workers, the employer, clients or customers." 9 1 Avoiding Pan Am's argument that customer
preferences were not based on stereotype thinking, the
court said that the wishes of the passengers, based on
nonmechanical aspects of the job, were too tangential to
the airline's duty to transport passengers safely to justify
92
sex discrimination.
Ten years later, Southwest Airlines unsuccessfully attempted to sidestep the Diaz decision. Wilson v. Southwest
Airlines9" was another class action brought by male job applicants refused employment by the airline. Southwest
justified its palpably discriminatory policy by claiming that
sex discrimination was crucial to its continued financial
success. It did so by placing before the court its famous
"" Id. at 565-66.

I/d.

Diaz, 442 F.2d at 388.
Id. at 387 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (1984)).
1'
Id. at 388.
93 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
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"love" personality. As the district court noted, unabashed allusions to love and sex pervaded all aspects of
the airline's public image. Southwest argued that customer preference for one sex was so strong that its business would be undermined if employees of the opposite
sex were hired.
Unfortunately for the airline, its statistical studies did
not support its premise that friendly flight attendants was
a prima facie motivation for customers choosing to fly
Southwest. Moreover, even if sex sold Southwest, such
customer preference would not rise to the level of a business necessity, as defined by Diaz. The court also found
disturbing the airline's attempt to make sex a BFOQ because it chose to exploit female sexuality as a marketing
tool. 94 There can be no doubt that female sex is not a
bona fide occupational qualification for the position of
airline cabin attendant.
Marital Status

2.

United Airlines and its flight attendants litigated for
years the airline's early requirement that female flight attendants be unmarried. In Sprogis v. United Airlines,9 5 decided in 1971, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit found the policy to involve sex discrimination and
affirmed the lower court's judgment against the airline.
United argued, citing an earlier Delta Airlines case, ° n
that the qualification merely distinguished between
classes of employees within the job category of flight attendant in the same manner as educational or physical requirements. The airline unsuccessfully argued to the
district court and court of appeals that the rule did not
constitute discrimination on the basis of sex. The court of
appeals, following an EEOC regulation,97 held that, even
if the rule is not directed against all females, so long as
Id. at 304.
444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971).
m, Cooper v. Delta Airlines, 274 F. Supp. 781 (E.D. La. 1967).
1

95

97

29 C.F.R. § 1604.3(a) (1984).
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sex is a factor in the rule's application, the company was
engaging in discrimination on the basis of sex.
The Seventh Circuit, citing the Diaz decision,98 quickly
dispensed with United's BFOQ argument. It noted the
only reason specifically addressed to the rule was that the
airline imposed the requirement after it received complaints from husbands concerning their wives' working
schedules and the irregularity of hours. The court found
the spouse's complaints insufficient as a matter of law to
be an indicator of employee competence.
3.

Pregnancy

Litigation about married female flight attendants invariably led to litigation about pregnant flight attendants. In
studying the history of this litigation, the Fourth Circuit
stated: "A number of the same medical experts have appeared in cross-sections of the decided cases. Some
courts have considered virtually the same medical testimony, and have reached such contradictory results that it
is impossible to reconcile them." 99 One may safely conclude, however, that while discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy violates Title VII, some business necessities
will justify a mandatory maternity leave policy.
The 1977 case of In re National Airlines 100 explored the
boundaries of decision making based on pregnancy. The
decision preceded the 1978 amendments to Title VII
treating discrimination solely on the basis of pregnancy as
sex discrimination. 10 1 The court found that a mandatory
pregnancy leave policy discriminated against women, as it
was not an equivalent term and condition of employment
with men. On the issue of National's BFOQ defense, the
court reviewed the testimony of four eminent physicians
, Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1199 (citing Diaz, 442 F.2d at 387).
9!1Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, 633 F.2d 361, 368 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 965 (1981).
oo 434 F. Supp. 249, 266, 269 (S.D. Fla. 1977), aff'd, 700 F.2d 695 (11 th Cir.
1982).
...42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-(k) (1982).
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and found that if a flight attendant could perform safety
tasks before pregnancy, she could do so while pregnant,
at least during the first thirteen weeks.1 0 2 From the period
of thirteen to twenty weeks, the issue would have to be
treated on an individual basis. After twenty weeks, the
airline was justified in requiring the flight attendant to
take leave. The primary issue was one of safety, and,
most importantly, evacuating an aircraft in the event of an
emergency. The court found the policy justified as a business necessity, as well as a bona fide occupational
qualification.
Other decisions have upheld air carrier policies requiring flight attendants to discontinue flying immediately
upon knowledge of pregnancy. In Condit v. United Airlines,10 3 the employees did not dispute the right to ground
pregnant flight attendants, but argued that leave should
not be required during the first five or six months of pregnancy absent individualized medical support. The district
court rejected plaintiffs' argument; the unequivocal opinion stated, "The safety of the passengers must come first
In case of doubt, that doubt must be resolved in favor
of the passengers - Airlines must take no chances when it
comes to safety."10 4 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit affirmed. 10 5 Cases involving Delta Airlines, 10 6 Pan
Am, 10 7 and Eastern 0 8 reached similar results. A 1977
case involving American Airlines' 0 9 reached a result similar to the National Airlines decision.
The most recent decision upholding immediate maternity leave was Levin v. Delta Airlines," 0 decided in 1984.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted that
102

NationalAirlines, 434 F. Supp. at 263.

103 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 689 (E.D. Va. 1976), aff'd, 558 F.2d 1176

(4th Cir. 1977).

Condit, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 693.
Condit, 558 F.2d at 1177.
0- Levin v. Delta Air Lines, 730 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1984).
107 Harriss v. Pan American World Airways, 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980).
1o, Burwell, 633 F.2d at 361.
109MacClennan v. American Airlines, 440 F. Supp. 466 (E.D. Va. 1977).
,to 730 F.2d at 994.
1-4

1-5

56

JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE

[53

Delta's pregnancy policy was discriminatory before 1978
as having a disparate impact on women, and after the
1978 amendment, it constituted disparate treatment.
However, the court found that the airline upheld its
BFOQdefense, and issues of pretext and motivation were
irrelevant. Finally, the court rejected plaintiff's argument
that the airline was required to shift pregnant flight attendants to available ground positions rather than placing
them on unpaid maternity leave. The court eschewed the
premise that a "less discriminatory alternative""' required the airline to place flight attendants in any ground
position, including ones for which they had not been
trained.
4.

Reinstatement and Seniority

In earlier cases involving termination of married and
pregnant flight attendants, the issue arose as to whether
the airline was required to give retroactive seniority to
flight attendants whose termination violated Title VII.
The issue created a difficult problem for unions representing displaced workers. Employees who had not taken
leave or been terminated objected to loss of seniority to
plaintiff class members, many of whom had not worked
for several years.
Cases involving American Airlines" l 2 and United Airlines" t3 held that it was permissible for a settlement agreement not to provide retroactive credit for those
terminated employees who returned. In litigation involving Trans World Airlines,"t 4 the issue was whether the airline had to reemploy plaintiff class members, terminated
I This concept has its basis in the Supreme Court case of Ablemarle Paper Co.
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), and was expanded in Wright v. Olin Corp., 697
F.2d 1172, 1191 (4th Cir. 1986).
12 Air Line Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n v. American Airlines, 763 F.2d 875
(7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 802 (1986).
'1-1Romasanta v. United Air Lines, Inc., 717 F.2d 1140 (7th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 944 (1984).
1,4 Air Line Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n v. Trans World Airlines, 713 F.2d
319 (7th Cir. 1983).
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on account of marriage, as soon as they could be trained,
or whether reemployment had to be contingent on existing vacancies. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, referring to its prior approval of a settlement
agreement, 15 held that the airline was required to hire
only as vacancies became available. This litigation occurred at the time when TWA furloughed several of its
employees, and a different result would have had an adverse affect on the airline.
5.

Equal Pay Between Male and Female Attendants

While not litigated solely under Title VII, two cases in
which male flight attendants were paid higher wages than
female attendants reached opposite results. Northwest
Airlines was found liable for violating the Equal Pay Act of
1963116 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in
Laffey v. Northwest Airlines,"t 7 because salaries paid to women employed as flight attendants were lower than those
paid to men serving as pursers for work found to be substantially equal. Other violations included providing
female flight attendants with less desirable layover accommodations and allowances for uniform maintenance, as
well as imposing weight restrictions on female flight attendants only. The litigation, including substantial
awards of attorneys' fees to plaintiffs' counsel, stretched
over two decades." 8
Northwest conceded that its prior practice of refusing
to allow females to become pursers violated Title VII.
However, it challenged the court's findings that the jobs
were intrinsically equal and thus commanded equal salaries even for flight attendants who might not seek purser
status. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's
115 Air Line Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n v. Trans World Airlines, 630 F.2d
1164 (7th Cir. 1980).

1"

29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970).

567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978).
Il For a complete history of the litigation, and an extended discussion of the
multimillion dollar fee award, see Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 746 F.2d 4 (D.C.
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1021 (1985).
117
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finding that the respective employment burdens did not
justify unequal pay and other practices. The court noted
that pursers assigned to flights in which they did not function as "senior cabin attendants" received the same salary
as supervisory flight attendants, but female flight attendants rendering like services did not derive supplemental
income." 9 The evidence showed that flight attendants'
supervisory labors might even exceed those of pursers,
who were often positioned in the first class section with
less responsibility and few supervisory duties because of
20
assistance from other experienced flight personnel.
The same issue yielded a contrary result in Maguire v.
Trans World Airlines.'2 ' The district court found that Laffey
had no precedential value, because it involved a different
employer, and because the factual settings of the two
cases were so significantly different as to justify a contrary
result. The court dismissed the Title VII claim as untimely commenced.
In Maguire, a pay differential existed between cabin attendants on international flights (higher) and domestic
flights (lower). Another distinction was made between
cabin attendants on international flights (lower) and pursers (higher). As at Northwest, the practice of hiring pursers began with commencement of international flights.
However, TWA hired and promoted female flight attendants to pursers.
The district court held that unequal pay resulted from
disparate job responsibilities and was not because of sex.
Contrasting TWA and Northwest, the district court noted
that TWA did not have a position of senior cabin attendant. The purser always had responsibilities for cabin service and never flew on domestic flights. The TWA cabin
attendant was never in charge of cabin service on international flights. The different and additional duties of pursers included dealing with the airline's commissary;
-. Laffey, 567 F.2d at 451.
Id. at 442-43.
2 , 535 F. Supp. 1283 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd, 722 F.2d 728 (2d Cir. 1983).

12)

1987]

AIRLINE LABOR & EMPLOYMENT

59

determining and obtaining governmental forms necessary
for international flights; briefing the captain and cabin attendants before each flight; being more proficient in foreign languages; completing and properly delivering all
United States and foreign government forms and reports
required from the airline; recording sales of liquor and
other items; and accounting for currency received from
sales, including conversion of foreign currencies into domestic currency. 22 The comparison of the job responsibilities, together with a lack of history of discrimination,
resulted in the verdict in favor of TWA.
B.

Miscellaneous Title VII Actions

1.

Transsexuality

In a case of first and lasting impression for airlines, the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that
transsexuality was not a protected status for purposes of a
Title VII action. In Ulane v. Eastern Airlines,' 23 Karen
Ulane, formerly Kenneth Ulane, brought suit alleging that
Eastern Airlines violated Title VII's prohibitions against
discrimination toward transsexuals and women by refusing to return him/her to flight status and terminating
him/her after "gender reassignment surgery." Eastern
terminated plaintiff on the grounds that psychological
problems associated with transsexualism threatened the
safety of the airline, and that because surgery was medically unproven as a cure for "gender disphoria," potential
risk to the safety of the passengers existed.
The district court denied the airline's motion to dismiss, 1 24 finding that transsexuals were protected by Title
VII. The district court's decision in favor of the plaintiff
included a scathing attack on the airline's decision and its
supporting evidence. 25 Contrary to opinions which gave
122

Id. at 1291-96.

12-,742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1017 (1985).
12 Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1438 (N.D. Ill.
1982).
,. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 581 F. Supp. 821 (N.D. Ill.
1983).
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airlines a wide latitude in protecting the safety of its passengers, Judge John F. Grady found Eastern's safety arguments to be a pretext for sex discrimination.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed,
holding as a matter of law that transsexuals were not intended by Congress to be a protected class when it enacted Title VII. 126 The decision avoided the necessity of
determining the merits of Eastern's defenses. The Seventh Circuit also found that in the absence of proof that
Eastern discriminated against Ulane as a woman, rather
than as a transsexual, the district court's judgment in
on that count was erroneous as a matfavor of the12 plaintiff
7
ter of law.
2.

Height and Weight Requirements

As seen in the flight engineer and pregnancy cases, similar medical evidence often yields different results. Courts
of appeals in Gerdom v. ContinentalAirlines 128 and Laffey v.
Northwest Airlines 129 held that the airlines violated Title VII
by enforcing height and weight requirements against female flight attendants, while not enforcing similar requirements against males. While acknowledging the
benefit to the employer of a trim flight crew, the courts
denied that application of these requirements solely to
women constituted a bona fide occupational qualification
or business necessity.
Several other courts, for example Jarrel v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. 130 and Leonard v. NationalAirlines, Inc.,'3 have up"26 Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085. Legal historians will find no legislative history on
Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination. Congress was concerned with race
discrimination when it enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Sex as a basis for
discrimination was added as a floor amendment one day before the House approved Title VII without prior debate. The amendment ironically was the gambit
of a Southern Congressman hoping to scuttle adoption of the entire bill. See Developments in the Law - Employment Discriminationof Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1167 (1971).
27 Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1087.
128 692 F.2d 602, 609 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. dismissed, 460 U.S. 1074 (1983).
121 567 F.2d 429, 454 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978).
.. 430 F. Supp. 884 (E.D. Va. 1977), aft'd, 577 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1978).
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held physiologically based policies where they were
reasonably applied to both men and women. Courts are
more willing to approve limitations on weight than height,
since like race and sex, height cannot be changed, while
weight can. An enterprising United employee attempted
to bypass the airline's weight limitations by alleging that
he was a handicapped individual protected by Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act.1 3 2 A federal district court, however, did not reward such ingenuity, and found that he
was not protected by Section 504 in Tudyman v. United
1 33
Airlines.
3.

Religious Accommodation

Title VII makes it an unlawful employment practice to
discriminate against an employee on the basis of religion.
The Act requires an employer, short of "undue hardship," to "reasonably accommodate" 134 the religious
needs of its employees. The landmark case on this issue is
Trans World Airlines v. Hardison,13 5 decided by the Supreme
Court of the United States in 1977. The employee
worked as a clerk in the stores department of TWA's Kansas City base. After his employment, Hardison became a
member of the Worldwide Church of God, a tenet of
which was that one must observe the Sabbath by refraining from performing any work from sunset on Friday
until sunset on Saturday. The airline temporarily solved
the problem by transferring Hardison to the 11:00 p.m. to
7:00 a.m. shift. The problem resurfaced when the employee bid for and received a transfer to another position,
where he did not have sufficient seniority to observe the
Sabbath regularly. Attempts by the airline, the employee,
and the Machinist's Union to resolve the problem were
1- 434 F. Supp. 269 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
1.12 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
-., 608 F. Supp. 739, 746 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
1.1 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(c) (1986).

,5432 U.S. 63 (1977).
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unavailing, and TWA terminated Hardison for failing to
report to work on a Saturday.
The Supreme Court, reversing the decision of the court
of appeals1 36 in favor of the plaintiff, found that TWA
made reasonable efforts to accommodate Hardison's religious needs, and that the airline did not have to breach a
collective bargaining agreement to do so. Nor was the
airline required to permit plaintiff to work a four-day work
week, as this would have left the airline shorthanded on at
least one shift a week. The majority of the Supreme Court
found that requiring the airline to incur such additional
13 7
costs was not justified.
More recently, a pilot whose religion prohibited him
from working on the Sabbath prevailed in a Title VII suit
against United Airlines. The district court found that
United did not make reasonable attempts to accommodate the pilot's schedule in Kendall v. United Airlines.' 38
The court denied any relief to the plaintiff, but awarded
attorney's fees.
4.

Hairstyle

In Rogers v. American Airlines,' 39 a federal district court
held that a flight attendant's hairstyle was not protected
by Title VII. However, it denied the airline's motion to
dismiss the claim that the airline discriminatorily applied
its grooming rules against black flight attendants.
III.

RAILWAY LABOR ACT

Collective bargaining in the private airline industry is
governed by the Railway Labor Act, 40 and not the National Labor Relations Act.' 4' The RLA involves a higher
degree of governmental intervention with respect to dis'. Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975).

,-7 Hardison, 432 U.S. at 85.
3- 494 F. Supp. 1380, 1391 (N.D. Il. 1980).
1m.527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).

14o45 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
14 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
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pute resolution than the NLRA, and less governmental in42
tervention in all other aspects of labor relations.
Grievances, referred to as "minor disputes," must be adjusted by voluntarily established boards of adjustment or
by an administrative agency.' 43 The Act provides for the
National Mediation Board to mediate major disputes, or
interest disputes, and certain nonadjusted minor disputes.
The Board may also induce the parties to submit disputes
not resolved by mediation to arbitration. Compliance
with the dispute settlement procedures of the Act can be
enforced in court.' 44 Decisions of System Boards of Adjustment are subject to a very narrow scope of review by
145
federal appeals courts and are seldom reversed.
It is not the purpose of this article to analyze the many
issues arising under the Railway Labor Act. It will discuss
two issues. The first is the interplay between the arbitration process and public policy safety issues. The second is
the question of the extent to which the RLA preempts
common law tort and contract claims.
A.

Arbitration and Public Policy

The Railway Labor Act's interest in deference to arbitration of disputes will sometimes conflict with the parties'
notions of public policy. With respect to the airlines, the
foremost public policy is that of safety. The recent case of
Northwest Airlines v. Air Line Pilots Association 146 illustrates
the tension involved between these concepts and the
great deference afforded to arbitrators' decisions by
courts pursuant to the RLA.
Following an alcohol related incident, Northwest discharged First Officer Larry Morrison. ALPA filed a grievance on the pilot's behalf, with the result that the panel of
14
For a more complete discussion of the differences between the RLA and
NLRA see Arouca & Perritt, TransportationLabor Regulation: Is the Railway Labor Act
or the National Labor Relations Act the Better Statutory Vehicle?, 36 LAB. L.J. 145 (1985).
143

45 U.S.C. § 153 (1982).

Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 402 U.S. 570, 581 (1971).
,45 See, e.g., Henry v. Delta Airlines, 759 F.2d 870, 871-72 (11th Cir. 1985).
.. 808 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
'4

64

JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE

[53

the Northwest Airline System Board of Adjustment issued
an arbitration award finding that since the pilot suffered
from alcoholism, Northwest's discharge was "without just
cause" under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement between the parties. The Board ruled that the pilot
should be offered reinstatement, without back pay or benefits, on certification by the Federal Air Surgeon that he
had recovered from the effects of his alcoholism, including at least two years' abstinence from alcohol.
Northwest filed a complaint in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia seeking to set aside the
arbitration award. The court granted summary judgment
for the airline, finding the Board's award inconsistent with
public policy. 147 The union appealed, contending that the
district court acted in excess of its authority in overturning the Board's arbitration award. The court of appeals
reversed and reinstated the arbitration award.
The court of appeals noted that judges had no license
to impose their own brand ofjustice in determining applicable public policy. Public policy emanates from clear
statutory or case law, and not from general considerations
of supposed public interest. 148 The appeals court held
that the trial judge erred in ignoring the fact that the parties' agreement to arbitrate did not exclude safety related
grievances, noting that there had been numerous arbitrations under the RLA involving grievances implicating
safety issues, and that no court had ever held that an arbi49
tral board lacked jurisdiction to consider such issues.
B.

Preemption

As will be discussed in the next section on wrongful discharge law, courts are continually recognizing and creating new causes of action for employees against employers.
The results often obliterate the distinction between tort
and contract actions. The doctrine of preemption, a diffi,47 Northwest Airlines v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 633 F. Supp. 779 (D.D.C. 1985).
148 Northwest Airlines, 808 F.2d at 78.
149

Id. at 81-82.
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cult concept in any setting, assumes added importance as
industrious attorneys attempt to draft complaints to evade
the procedures set forth in the Railway Labor Act and to
recover greater damages for discharged employees.'5t
The preemption doctrine in labor law has been affected
by two competing concerns. First, state law must be preempted to protect the primary jurisdiction of the administrative agency created by Congress to oversee the
development of uniform rules of law governing labormanagement relations. 15' Therefore, arguably, courts
generally may not adjudicate claims based on conduct
protected or prohibited by federal labor law. 152 On the
other hand, the Supreme Court has been unwilling to preempt all local regulation touching or concerning the rela5 3
tionships between employees, employers, and unions.'
Thus when state law seeks to regulate conduct which is
only a "peripheral concern" of federal labor law or where
it touches interests "deeply rooted" in local feeling and
responsibility, courts must employ a balancing test to
weigh the potential harm to the federal scheme against
the importance of the state's interest in protecting its
citizens. 15
Preemption under the Railway Labor Act has been
more stringent than under the National Labor Relations
Act. Garden variety wrongful discharge actions, so-called
"minor disputes" involving rights under the collective
bargaining agreement, are ordinarily subject to
mandatory arbitration. 5 5 As the Supreme Court has
noted, "Congress considered it essential to keep these so150 A vast body of literature exists on this topic. See Cox, Recent Developments in
FederalLabor Law Preemption, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 277 (1980); Lesnick, Preemption Reconsidered: The Apparent Reaffirmation of Garmon, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 469 (1972);
Come, FederalPreemption of Labor-ManagementRelations: Current Problems In the Application of Garmon, 56 VA. L. REV. 1435 (1970).
151

Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).

San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959).
153Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v.
Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1970), reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 874 (1971).
154 Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 430 U.S. 290, 296 (1977).
1. Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 406 U.S. 320, 322-23 (1972).
152
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called 'minor disputes' within the Adjustment Board and
out of the courts."'' 56 As a result, courts will carefully
scrutinize any discharge claim by a union employee to determine whether arbitration provides the appropriate forum for resolution.
In Peterson v. Airline Pilots Association International,157 a pilot sued his union alleging that it coerced his employer
into firing him for his prior failure to respect a nationwide
ALPA job action. He contended that the union failed to
live up to its duty of fair representation and violated state
law prohibiting blacklisting, conspiracy, and interference
with a contractual relationship. The district court held
that his state law claims were preempted by the Railway
Labor Act, and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
The court concluded that the allegations in Peterson's
complaint were hardly peripheral to the concerns of federal labor law. It also found the state law claims nearly
identical to the federal claim in substance and relief. The
court rejected plaintiff's argument that his claims fell
within the "outrageous conduct"'' 58 exception to preemption. While noting that a state has a substantial interest in
protecting its citizens from alleged outrageous conduct,
the claims of the plaintiff did not rise to that level, and the
large overlap between the state and federal claims required preemption.
In Majors v. U.S. Air,'5 9 plaintiff alleged false imprisonment and defamation arising out of an incident in which
he was accused of theft while on the job. The district
court, in an opinion often cited in decisions upholding
preemption, found that the state did not have an overriding interest in resolving this matter. The court also held
that the collective bargaining agreement did not have to
156 Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89, 94 (1978), reh'g denied, 439
U.S. 1135 (1979).
,.17
759 F.2d 1161 (4th Cir. 1985).
158 See Farmer, 430 U.S. at 301.
-1, 525 F. Supp. 853 (D. Md. 1981).
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refer specifically to the issue between the employee and
employer to mandate preemption, as long as the issue ar160
guably fell within federal labor law.
A federal district court found a claim for fraud to be
preempted in Schwadron v. Trans World Airlines.16 1 Plaintiff
had been furloughed by the airline and found employment elsewhere. He resigned his new job when advised
by TWA that he was being called back, only to find that
the information was incorrect. He filed a grievance
through his union, and proceeded through the first two
stages of a four-step procedure. When the union withdrew its assistance at the third stage, plaintiff filed suit for
negligent misrepresentation in state court. The airline removed the case to the federal district court, which granted
the airline's motion to dismiss. It concluded that the dispute was subject to the Railway Labor Act, and that the
narrow
exception for outrageous
conduct was
inapplicable.
A similar result occurred in Schroeder v. Trans World Airlines, 1 6 2 in which a student captain was taken off of a training program. The airline removed his state court suit
alleging unlawful business practices, and then moved to
dismiss the complaint. The district court, looking to the
substance of the complaint rather than the form, held that
it was essentially one for wrongful demotion and that the
Railway Labor Act preempted it. The Court of Appeals
163
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal.
State courts have also had occasion to analyze preemption issues when unionized airline employees have raised
tort claims. Most recently, in DeTomaso v. Pan American
World Airways, 16 4 the California Supreme Court reversed
the decisions of the trial and intermediate appellate
6,

Id. at 857.

585 F. Supp. 1371 (W.D. Pa. 1984).
16 702 F.2d 189, 191 (9th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 192.
43 Cal. 3d 517, 733 P.2d 614, 235 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1987).

68

JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE

[53

courts 165 which awarded actual and punitive damages to a
Pan Am employee who had already resolved a grievance
with the airline involving the same subject matter.
Plaintiff was a cargo handler who was terminated for
fraud, dishonesty and abuse of company policy after he
allegedly stole company property in the presence of his
family and co-workers. On the same day as his discharge,
plaintiff filed a grievance claiming his termination violated
the agreement between Pan Am and his union. During
the arbitration process, the parties agreed to a settlement
reinstating plaintiff and making him whole. Plaintiff filed
suit prior to discharge and settlement of the grievance,
but even after settlement of the grievance, amended his
complaint seeking damages for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The jury awarded
plaintiff $265,000 in general damages and $300,000 in
punitive damages. The trial court granted the motion for
a new trial on the limited issue of damages and both parties appealed. The court of appeals affirmed the verdict,
holding that plaintiff's damages did not flow from his discharge or from the collective bargaining agreement, but
from the false charges and outrageous conduct of the airline in accusing him of theft.
The Supreme Court of California, in a 4-0 decision, reversed. It aptly noted that the airline followed the requirements of the collective bargaining agreement in
investigating and terminating the plaintiff, and that the
union appeared on the employee's behalf throughout the
dispute. Looking to the substance of the claims and not
their characterization, the California Supreme Court
found that all of DeTomaso's claimed damages flowed
from his wrongful dismissal from employment. 166 Adjudication of such issues would necessarily involve interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, which a court
has no jurisdiction to do. Mere theoretical legal indepen"

DeTomaso v. Pan American World Airways, 174 Cal. App. 3d 1023, 220 Cal.

Rptr. 493 (1985).
166 DeTomaso, 733 P.2d at 622.
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dence does not save a purported tort cause of action from
preemption by the RLA. Instead, it must appear from the
employee's complaint that the facts forming the basis of a
cause of action either: 1) are unrelated to matters expressly or impliedly governed by the collective bargaining
agreement, or 2) so far exceed the scope of reasonable
conduct in the context of such matters that reference to
the collective bargaining agreement is unnecessary to re167
solve the claim.
The California Supreme Court's decision coincides with
the ruling of the California Court of Appeals in Miller v.
United Airlines. 168 The plaintiff was a senior flight attendant whose performance was the subject of a petition circulated by junior co-workers. The result, in plaintiff's
estimation, was that the employees and the airline were
engaging in a pattern of harassment to force her to quit.
Plaintiff filed a contractual grievance as well as a grievance
under the collective bargaining agreement.
The court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment,
finding that nine of the counts were preempted by the
Railway Labor Act. It found no authority allowing an employee to seek damages for emotional and physical distress by filing a state tort claim in order to circumvent the
federal statute.
The Railway Labor Act preempts claims of members of
labor organizations only. Recent federal and state court
cases on this issue have reached similar results. 69 Nonunion employees are free to pursue common law contract
and tort remedies, a right they have availed themselves of
frequently, as the following section demonstrates.
IV.

EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL AND TORT CASES

As noted earlier in this article, a major revolution in
American labor and employment law during the last ten
'6

Id. at 621.

'" 174 Cal. App. 3d 878, 220 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1985).

"69See Gorrill v. Icelandair/Flugleidir, 761 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1985); Mungo v.
UTA French Airlines, 166 Cal. App. 3d 327, 212 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1985).
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years has been the erosion of the doctrine of at-will employment. 170 Under the traditional rules, unless circumstances indicated otherwise, a contract which set forth an
annual salary rate but no definite term of employment was
considered to be for indefinite employment, terminable at
the will of either party' without incurring liability for
breach of contract. The traditional rule has received
harsh criticism from academic commentators, as well as
from many state and federal judges who have condemned
the doctrine as archaic and barbarous.' 7 ' The result has
been a proliferation of exceptions to the rule and the substitution of new tort causes of action for traditional contract claims and remedies. The airline industry has not
escaped these changes.
There are four theories by which courts have recognized a cause of action for wrongful discharge, and they
are often commingled.17 2 They are: (1) the discharge violates public policy; 173 (2) the discharge violates an implied
contract term; 74 (3) the discharge violates an implied
duty of good faith and fair dealing in all employment contracts; 75 and (4) the discharge gives rise to a tort claim,
usually outrageous conduct or defamation. 76 This article
will discuss these theories with respect to the airline industry, but will not attempt to dissect all of the many issues that arise in this type of litigation.
170 See, e.g., Tarnofsky, The Employment-At-Will Doctrine and Non-Union Airlines: Impact on Both Employees and Employers, 50 J. AIR L. & CoM. 123 (1984).
171 See infra note 172; Sabine Pilot Serv. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985).
172 A cornucopia of articles exists on this subject.
The more important ones
include: Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive
Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967); Note, ProtectingAt Will
Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1816 (1980); Note, Protecting Employees At Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931 (1983). For one of the few
articles deploring this trend see, Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U.
Cm. L. REV. 947 (1984).
173 See infra subsection A.
174 See infra subsection B.
1- See infra subsection C.
176 See infra subsection D.
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Public Policy Discharge

This theory was the first to gain judicial acceptance, and
is subject to different degrees of interpretation depending
on the jurisdiction. Many decisions have limited public
policy discharges to discharges in retaliation for the employee's exercise of a right specifically protected by state
law or refusal to commit acts prohibited by law.' 77 In
more liberal jurisdictions, courts have set forth their own
concepts of public policy, whereby any action of the employer deemed sufficiently unconscionable will be characterized as contrary to public policy.178 It can be safely
concluded that dismissal of an employee for exercising
rights guaranteed by state law, such as filing a worker's
compensation claim, 179 or for failure to participate in an
activity violating state law,' 80 will be deemed discharges in
violation of public policy.
Not surprisingly, cases coming out of the airline industry on this issue involve safety concerns. In Buethe v. Britt
Airlines,' 8 ' plaintiff filed suit in state court in Indiana alleging that he was discharged by the air carrier after he refused to fly an airplane he considered to be unsafe. The
case was removed to federal court. After a prior appeal
disposing of jurisdictional questions, the district court
and court of appeals ruled in favor of the airline on the
merits. Twice, over the orders of the pilot in command,
plaintiff refused to fly company aircraft, resulting in flight
cancellations. The alleged defects involved the autofeather system in one instance, and the fire warning light
in the other.
Buethe claimed his dismissal violated public policy as
expressed in Section 8-21-2-2 of the Indiana Code, requiring aircraft operating within the state to conform to
177 See, e.g., Lampe v. Presbyterian Med. Center, 41 Colo. App. 465, 590 P.2d
513 (1978).
178 See, e.g., Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
17o Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973).
'so Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025
(1985).
1-1 787 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1986).
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federal airworthiness standards. The district court and
court of appeals disagreed. Judge Posner, speaking for
the Seventh Circuit, held that the statute did not purport
to create a right on the part of co-pilots or other crew
members to refuse to fly an aircraft that they did not believe to be airworthy. The court found no policy expressed in Indiana that would permit airline employees to
decide when an aircraft could be flown.
A similar case was Rachford v. Evergreen International
Airlines, 182 in which a flight engineer claimed he was discharged for informing the Federal Aviation Administration about excessive oil consumption by one of the
company's aircraft. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief could be
granted, and the district court granted the motion.
Judge Leighton found that plaintiff's complaint did not
sufficiently state a claim for retaliatory discharge under Illinois law, as the doctrine of retaliatory discharge required the termination to be in violation of public policy
of the state. He noted that while Illinois has a general policy in favor of aviation safety, the state has no interest in
enforcing federal law, even if that federal law is allegedly
incorporated in the state's general public policy. The
court also dismissed plaintiff's claim allegedly premised
on a private, right of action under the Federal Aviation
Act. "83
' The court could find no right of action, either express or implied, that would have permitted an employee
to sue an air carrier, nor did the Act require an air carrier
to continue to employ an employee. Finally, the court dismissed plaintiff's final claim that his consultation with fellow employees and representation of their joint safety
concerns to management constituted protected activity
within the Railway Labor Act. Since plaintiff was not a
member of a labor organization, he could not seek the
1"2

596 F. Supp. 384 (N.D. Il1. 1984).

- 49 U.S.C. §§ 1421, 1425 (1982).
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protection of the RLA.' 84
A claim failing to allege or prove that an employee was
discharged for exercising specific statutory rights, or alleging vague and general rights, will not be sufficient to
support a claim for a public policy discharge. In Cataniav.
Eastern Airlines,' 85 plaintiffs contended their discharges violated the public policy of Florida as articulated in the
state's right to work law. The court of appeals concluded
that the claim was based on allegations "too general to
86
permit legal analysis." In Grandchampv. United Air Lines,'
the United States District Court for Colorado dismissed a
claim for public policy discharge in the absence of any allegation of termination for exercising statutorily protected rights. However, as will be discussed, plaintiffs did
prevail in Grandchamp on a tort theory. In Kavanagh v.
KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 18 7 the district court dismissed an
employee's suit alleging KLM terminated him in violation
of public policy because he hired an attorney to represent
him in a dispute with the airline.
Unlike cases arising out of civil rights statutes, reference to cases involving airlines on this issue will not assist
in predicting the outcome of a given suit, which will be
governed by state law. Assuming the public policy allegation is not itself preempted by another statute (such as
Title VII, ADEA, or OSHA),' 8 the trend appears to be
toward a sharper definition of public policy, finding its
source in state statutes or constitutions. The other major
body of public policy discharge cases, which have not as
yet involved airlines, include termination for refusal to
commit crimes such as perjury, 89 or price fixing, 90 or for
184

See Davin v. Delta Air Lines, 678 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1982); see also 45 U.S.C.

§ 152 (1982).
381 So. 2d 265 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
36 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 34,987 (D. Colo. 1985); see infra note 217 and
accompanying text for further discussion of Grandchamp.
117 566 F. Supp. 242 (N.D. Il.1983).
-8 29 U.S.C. §§ 654(a), 660(c) (1982).
181,
Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344
185

18

P.2d 25 (1959).
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reporting violations to governmental agencies. ' 91
B.

Implied Contracts

Airlines, like many large employers, issue employee
manuals to document and explain company practices and
procedures. As a result, employees without written contracts have often seized on these manuals as creating contractual rights. The alleged rights range from due process
procedures up to a substantive right not to be discharged
except for just cause. Courts have also enforced oral
promises for permanent employment where they found
promises to be sufficiently definite and supported by
other consideration. The doctrine itself is less than ten
years old, with the landmark case being Toussiant v. Blue
92
Cross and Blue Shield. 1
In Brooks v. Trans World Airlines,' 93 the federal district
court in Colorado denied the airline's motion for summary judgment, holding that the company's management
policy and procedure manual gave the employee the right
to bump other employees, notwithstanding the fact that
the manual was unilaterally promulgated by the airline.
The implied contract doctrine may be applied to discipline and demotion as well as to termination.
Ironically, a federal court in California denied that
TWA's management policy and procedure manual created
an implied promise that the airline "would not act arbitrarily in dealing with its employees."'' 94 Without citing
Brooks, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
that the threshold issue is whether the parties reached an
implied meeting of the minds regarding certain aspects of
their employment relationship. In the case before it, the
court held that the manual could not be viewed as a mani-

It-

Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 839 (1980).
191Thompson v. St. Regis Paper, 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984).
192 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
m., 574 F. Supp. 805 (D. Colo. 1983).
1..4 Gianaculas v. Trans World Airlines, 761 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1985).
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festation of the intent of the parties because it conflicted
with the employment application which stated the employment was terminable at will. The Ninth Circuit therefore affirmed the dismissal of the case, brought by
management employees who were furloughed for refusing to accept continued employment in nonmanagement
positions.
195 the Second Circuit
In Gorrill v. Icelandair/Flugleidir,
found former pilots of Icelandair were entitled to contract
protection from the airline employee manual. The record
showed that the plaintiffs had sought written employment
agreements, but were assured that the company would
follow its operations manual.
In Parker v. United Airlines,196 the Court of Appeals of
Washington rejected an employee's argument that employment forms referring to "regular employment" and
setting forth specific grounds for dismissal prevented the
airline from terminating her employment without just
cause. The employment forms and the manual stating
that an employee could be discharged for cause or economic reasons were held to be unenforceable promises.
The court of appeals also rejected plaintiff's argument
that her promise to indemnify United for losses it might
sustain because of her acts and to assign to it inventions
made during the course of her work constituted "independent consideration" requiring dismissal only for
cause.
The case of Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. Keenan ' in
which the Supreme Court of Colorado recently adopted
the implied contract doctrine, illustrates many of the issues that arise when this theory is invoked. Plaintiff, a
managerial employee in Continental's Denver domicile,
was terminated after several customer complaints. Keenan alleged breach of an implied contract in that the
airline's employee manual purportedly afforded him pro761 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1985); see supra note 169.
32 Wash. App. 722, 649 P.2d 181 (1982).
11,7

731 P.2d 708 (Colo. 1987).
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cedural rights before he could be discharged and that
Continental lacked just cause to dismiss him.
At his deposition, plaintiff stated that he did not recall
discussing the employment manual when he was hired.
Continental filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the employment manual did not create any contract rights, but even if it did, those rights were not
bargained for. Plaintiff's memory suddenly improved,
and he filed an affidavit in response to the motion, asserting that he had discussed the manual and that it was an
important consideration in his acceptance of employment
with Continental. The district court granted the airline's
motion for summary judgment, but the court of appeals
reversed in a brief unpublished opinion.
The Supreme Court of Colorado, given the occasion to
make new law, proceeded to do so. After a brief review of
law in other juridictions, the court ruled that the presumption of at-will employment would not be considered
absolute, but would be rebuttable under certain circumstances. 98 Adopting neither the categorical rule that an
employee manual automatically becomes part of an employment contract, nor the contrary rule that manuals are
no more than unilateral expressions of company policy,
the court held that an employee could enforce termination procedures under two theories: 1) ordinary contract
principles reflected by offer and acceptance; and 2) the
theory of promissory estoppel, by which the employee
demonstrates that the employer should reasonably have
expected the employee to consider the manual as a commitment from the employer, and that the employee reasonably relied on termination procedures to his
detriment. 99 The Supreme Court remanded the case to
the trial court for disposition of Continental's motion for
summary judgment under the two alternate theories of liability. The exceptions to the rule fashioned by the court
in Keenan are generally fact intensive; therefore, employ,I, ld. at 711.
'" Id. at 711-12.
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ees following the court's guideline should at least be able
to create a jury question on the ultimate issue of liability.
If a discernible trend can be ascertained in this area, it
is that employee handbooks will be treated as more than
mere gratuities. 20 0 Absent any disclaimer to that effect,
they generally will be enforced if they contain provisions
giving employees procedural or substantive rights. Disclaimers have been upheld if sufficiently clear.20 ' If the
manual restricts itself to company policies such as vacation, sick leave, and other related matters, the manual
should not be found to confer protection against discharge.20 2 Some jurisdictions require that the handbook
or manual actually be bargained20 for,
but the standard of
3
proof has often been quite low.
C.

Implied Covenant of Good Faith and FairDealing

The doctrine of implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing began with insurance contracts, and has largely
remained there. However, activist courts, most notably in
California, have extended the duty to the employment
setting. The most prominent example of this theory, frequently cited by other courts, is Cleary v. American
Airlines.204
Plaintiff, an eighteen year employee of American, began
as a payroll clerk and worked his way up to an airport operations agent. He alleged that the airline wrongfully suspended him from his employment and wrongfully
terminated him without just cause, supposedly for comoo For an excellent discussion of the development of the law on this issue see
Barger v. General Electric, 599 F. Supp. 1154 (W.D. Va. 1984).
20" Sears, Roebuck & Co. has successfully defended these claims by raising the
disclaimer in its employee manual that the manual creates no contractual rights
and no employee has the right to waive any of the provisions of the manual. See,
e.g., Novosel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 495 F. Supp. 344 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
202 See
Hunt v. IBM Mid America, Employees Federal Credit Union, 384
N.W.2d 853 (Minn. 1986) (distinguishing Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333
N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983)).
203 See, e.g., Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roache, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257
(1985).
21,4

111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
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mitting violations of the airline's regulations, but in fact
for his union organizing activities. Plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive damages.
The trial court dismissed Cleary's complaint, but the
court of appeals reversed, holding that plaintiff sufficiently stated claims for relief. Commingling theories
from public policy discharge cases, implied contract cases,
and the landmark insurance cases of Comunale v. Traders &
General Insurance Co. 20 5 and Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance
Co.,206 the court held that the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing applied to all contracts, and that it
was unconditional and independent in nature. Having arrived at the conclusion that every contract in California
contained the duty of good faith and fair dealing, the
court found two considerations to support its decision
that plaintiff properly stated a claim for relief. The first
was his longevity of service and the second was the express policy of American Airlines to adopt specific procedures for adjudicating employee disputes. The court
remanded the case to the trial court for further consideration. As a federal judge recently noted, while attempting
to sort out the numerous California cases on this issue,
the result of Cleary was that more enlightened employers
faced greater potential liability from at-will employees.20 7
The Supreme Court of California is presently reconsidering all theories of wrongful discharge in the case of Foley
208
v. Interactive Data Corp.
Courts in other jurisdictions have almost unanimously
rejected the reasoning and result of the Cleary decision.
For example, while the court in Brooks v. Trans World Airlines 20 9 found an implied contract, it refused to find an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In
205
206
207

50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
9 Cal. 3d 556, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 510 P.2d 1032 (1973).
Cox v. Resilient Flooring, 638 F. Supp. 726, 739 (C.D. Cal. 1986).

174 Cal. App. 3d 282, 219 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1985), review granted, (Jan. 30,
1986).
209 574 F. Supp. at 805; see supra note 193 and accompanying text.
208
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Gianaculas v. Trans World Airlines210 the Ninth Circuit, interpreting California law, rejected the argument that the
airline's policy manual constituted standards of good faith
and fair dealing. Other suits against airlines in which
courts have rejected this theory are Grunn v. HawaiianAirlines, 2 1 a Georgia case; Yanai v. Japan Air Lines Co.,2 1 2 a
case from Hawaii; and Bouzianis v. U.S. Air,2 t3 a Massachusetts case.
Very few decisions have been reported in states that
recognize the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing
in employment contracts. In the recent case of Grayson v.
American Airlines,2 t4 the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, interpreting Oklahoma law, held that the airline's
termination of the plaintiff, due to a reduction in force
caused by the air traffic controllers' strike and general
slowdown in the airline industry, constituted "good
cause" for purposes of the parties' agreement requiring
good cause for termination. However, the court of appeals reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in the airline's favor on the issue of whether its
failure to find alternative positions for the plaintiff within
the company after termination breached the implied duty
of good faith and fair dealing.
Cases after Cleary have generally limited the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing to long-time employees, whom the courts seem to believe have a greater
expectation of fair treatment from their employers. Thus,
even if a court recognizes the doctrine, an employee must
allege sufficient facts to show why the doctrine should apply to the subject matter of the complaint.215
lo 761 F.2d at 1391; see supra note 194 and accompanying text.
-1 162 Ga. App. 474, 291 S.E.2d 779 (1982).
22
118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2042 (D. Haw. 1984).

2

213
214

120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2927 (D. Mass. 1985).
803 F.2d 1097 (10th Cir. 1986).

2-. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 199
Cal. Rptr. 613 (1984) (complaint insufficient); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116
Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981) (complaint sufficient).
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Tort Claims

It is axiomatic that damages recoverable under tort theories yield greater awards than traditional contract remedies. Tort damages include noneconomic losses such as
mental pain and suffering, as well as punitive damages.
Since the sky is literally the limit for damages in some tort
cases, former employees will often plead tort causes of action with claims for wrongful discharge. Such torts include fraud, libel and/or slander, and outrageous
conduct. In many cases the employees have prevailed.
In Crossman v. Trans World Airlines,2 16 plaintiff was hired
by TWA to work in Saudi Arabia. At the time of the hiring, TWA informed Crossman that he would later be
transferred to the payroll of Saudi Arabian Airlines
(Saudia). Plaintiff accepted employment with Saudia, and
worked on its payroll for approximately one year before
being charged with theft of Saudia property, and of an automobile. He served eleven months in a Saudi Arabian
prison. The authorities released him from prison and
sent him back to the United States. He filed a suit in Illinois against TWA and Saudia. The district court dismissed one claim for breach of contract and another for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Plaintiff claimed that TWA fraudulently misrepresented
that it would always be in Saudi Arabia, and that TWA
would not desert its former employees. Crossman alleged
the airline breached that promise by failing to assist him
while he was in prison. The court dismissed plaintiff's
claims for breach of contract and outrageous conduct as a
matter of law. It submitted the fraud counts to the jury,
which returned a verdict in plaintiff's favor for $75,000.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in a 2 to
1 decision, reversed the jury verdict and entered judgment in favor of TWA. It held that the trial court should
have granted the airline's motion for directed verdict on
the ground that plaintiff failed to prove that the alleged
21,)

777 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1985).
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misrepresentations caused his imprisonment in Saudi
Arabia. The appeals court decision, while properly decided, may have given plaintiff more benefit of the doubt
than deserved. Plaintiff conceded that TWA never promised him assistance in the event he were incarcerated, and
he even signed a foreign laws agreement stating that TWA
would not accept responsibility for violations of foreign
laws by its employees. The case illustrates the ability of
employees to raise a promise allegedly made before or
during employment as the basis for misrepresentation
claims, even when written policies and procedures belie
the promise's existence.
In Grandchamp v. United Air Lines, 2 17 an interesting decision whose precedential force will be decided in the appeal now pending before the Tenth Circuit, plaintiffs were
long-time employees of United in Denver who, on their
termination, filed suit raising every conceivable theory.
Judge Carrigan dismissed all claims except violation of
the Colorado Age Discrimination Act, and a pendent state
claim for outrageous conduct. Plaintiffs alleged that the
airline had embarked on a systematic program to eliminate older employees, and that this conduct was sufficiently outrageous in character and degree as to violate
everyday notions of decency. 18 Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their state statutory claim before trial. The court,
despite reservations, submitted the outrage claim to the
jury. The jury found in favor of the plaintiffs, and awarded
substantial damages. The trial court denied United's
post-trial motions, and the case is now on appeal.
Defamation claims often arise where a former employee
does not like the reasons given for termination, and where
the employer discloses the fact of termination to third
parties. The recent California decision of DeTomaso v. Pan
217

text.
218

36 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at

34,987; see supra note 186 and accompanying

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment d (1965).
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American World Airways, 2 9 discussed in the previous section, illustrates a case in which the plaintiff might have recovered both tort and contract damages but for the
preemption of the tort claims by the Railway Labor Act.
The tort damages for defamation certainly exceeded any
damages for wrongful termination. For precisely that reason, plaintiff vigorously attempted to avoid arbitration
through Railway Labor Act procedures. The California
Supreme Court held that the tort claims were preempted
by the RLA.
In Jones v. Britt Airways, 2 20 plaintiff alleged that on several occasions, her employer stated to other employees
that she had been dismissed for embezzling company
funds. Her discharge followed an incident involving a
voided airline ticket. Plaintiff had volunteered to assist in
the investigation, including taking a polygraph test, but
no investigation occurred before her termination. The
federal court interpreted Illinois law to hold that communication to any third party, including company employees,
satisfied the publication requirement. The airline also
failed to demonstrate that publication of its statement was
protected by a qualified privilege, leading to denial of its
motion for summary judgment. In Brantley v. Zantop InternationalAirlines,2 2 1 a Michigan federal court reached a similar conclusion on the publication issue.
The theory of negligent hiring has implications for the
employment practices of airlines, and further demonstrates the precarious position in which employers find
themselves. In Doe v. American Airlines,2 plaintiff alleged
negligent hiring because of the airline's failure to safeguard its passengers from exposure to employees having
contagious diseases. The lawsuit grew out of an alterca29, 43 Cal. 3d 517, 235 Cal. Rptr. 292, 733 P.2d 614 (1987); see supra note 164
and accompanying text.
22o 622 F. Supp. 398 (N.D. Il.
1985).
22 617 F. Supp. 1032 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
22 The case was filed in the Circuit Court for Cook County, Illinois on Septem-

ber 2, 1986. The docket number is 86 L. 19638. The author believes the case has
been removed to the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
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tion between a passenger and a boarding agent, who allegedly kicked plaintiff in the shins and bit her.
Following the incident, the passenger requested that
the AIDS antibody test be performed on the employee,
and the test result was positive. Plaintiff was tested for
AIDS antibodies, and the test showed negative. Plaintiff
sued for assault and battery, emotional and mental suffering, negligent hiring and exemplary damages. The case is
still pending.
Airlines, as well as other employers who serve the public, find themselves in a serious predicament as a result of
potential tort liability from claims such as Doe. Given the
recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States
in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,2 2 3 holding that
persons suffering from contagious diseases are "handicapped" for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act,2 2 4 employers must make reasonable accommodations for those
employees, and may not merely discharge them. Moreover, plaintiff's claim that American was negligent in not
screening employees for contagious diseases comes at a
time of increasing resistance to widescale testing of employees before hiring and during the employment
relationship 225
CONCLUSION

The era during which employers were free to decide the
fate of their workers without restriction is over. The enactment of the Railway Labor Act, various civil rights acts,
the erosion of the employment-at-will doctrine, and
evolution of intermingled theories of tort and contract are
harsh realities that every employer must address. The airline industry has been the subject of many of the most
'23

107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987).

29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982); see supra note 132.
2.
See, e.g., National Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 649 F. Supp. 380 (E.D.
La. 1986); Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Tenn. 1986);
Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986).
224
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significant labor and employment cases of the last ten
years.
With respect to federal civil rights statutes, airlines
must carefully scrutinize each new decision, as an opinion
involving one employer will not necessarily be applied to
another. In common law tort and contract suits, the airlines cannot necessarily assume that any discharge of a
unionized employee will automatically be resolved by arbitration before a board of adjustment. Finally, with respect to nonunionized employees, airlines cannot assume
that the bottom line in the event of liability will be limited
to loss of earnings and potential future earnings. The age
of American law when a tort was a tort and a contract a
contract has been replaced by an atmosphere where hiring, firing, and even retiring are subject to sudden change
in the law. The doctrine of stare decisis is no longer sacred.
The experience has been bitterly contested and extremely
costly.

